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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

CONTINUITY ON THE COURT: THE REHNQUIST COURT’S FREE
SPEECH CASES

ALAN J. HOWARD*

I. INTRODUCTION
1

In his Childress Lecture, Professor Thomas Merrill bases his claim that
there have been two Rehnquist Courts in part on what he sees as a dramatic
change in the Court’s legal agenda between its first and second eight years. He
grounds his findings on what he concedes is a “relatively thin slice of
constitutional cases”2—sixty-four cases—which he groups into two important
categories: constitutional federalism3 and social issues.4 Combined these two
categories make up around 4% of the Court’s decided cases during the past
sixteen years.5
* Professor of Law, Saint Louis University School of Law. I am grateful to my colleague, Dennis
Tuchler, and my brother, Bruce Howard, for their helpful comments. Special thanks goes to
Steve Wilke, my faculty fellow, for excellent research and editorial assistance. Steve also
deserves credit for preparing the charts.
1. Thomas W. Merrill, The Making of the Second Rehnquist Court: A Preliminary Analysis,
47 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 569 (2003).
2. Id. at 580.
3. Professor Merrill defines “constitutional federalism” cases as those involving “the scope
of federal power under the Commerce Clause and Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, Tenth
Amendment limitations on federal power, and state sovereign immunity from private lawsuits
reflected in the Eleventh Amendment.” Id. at 570.
4. Professor Merrill defines “social issues” as “the ‘culture war’ issues that sharply divide
liberal urban elites and the predominantly rural and suburban religious right.” Id. at 580. He
classifies “social issues cases” into five subcategories: “abortion,” “affirmative action,”
government speech on religious topics” (for example, school prayer and crèches in city hall),
“gay rights” and “other privacy rights” (for example, parental rights and the right to die). Id. at
654-56 app.A. Admitting this category is subjective at its root, he specifically excludes cases
involving obscenity, death penalty, the Establishment Clause, and legislative redistricting
because, in his judgment, they “do not pose the same sharp cleavage along ‘culture war’ lines as
do the issues [he has] included.” Id. at 580 n.23.
5. Like Professor Merrill’s lecture, the numbers used for this paper are also taken from the
statistics compiled in the annual Supreme Court volume of the Harvard Law Review. See, e.g.,
The Supreme Court, 2000 Term—The Statistics, 115 HARV. L. REV. 539 (2001). For the 2001
Term, see Linda Greenhouse, Court Had Rehnquist Initials Intricately Carved on Docket, N.Y.
TIMES, July 1, 2002, at A1. Similar to Professor Merrill, my numbers include some per curiam
opinions, and exclude some cases that were dismissed after argument without a decision. Over
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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

836

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 47:835

His focus on 4% of the Court’s decisions raises the obvious question: What
about the other 96%? Do his claims about changes in legal agenda—as
reflected in the two categories—extend to other areas of the Court’s work
product, including other areas of constitutional law? That is, does Professor
Merrill’s analysis support a two-Court theory in general, or is it merely an
interesting way of organizing 4% of the Court’s decisions?
My brief contribution to the symposium on Professor Merrill’s lecture
looks at the Rehnquist Court’s free speech cases—a species of cases that
Professor Merrill does not include among his “social issues.” The question I
seek to answer is whether one can find similar patterns of distinctive behavior
by the Rehnquist Court in the area of free speech in the same two periods.
From reviewing the Rehnquist Court’s hundred plus free speech decisions6—
over 6% of the Court’s cases—I conclude that there has not been any similar
kind of legal agenda change, although there may be some faint signs of other
kinds of changes that have materialized in the last few terms. My claim
therefore is that continuity—not change—best describes the Court’s free
speech jurisprudence throughout the period of the Rehnquist Court. My plan
here is to sketch a portrait of one Rehnquist Court, as opposed to the two
Rehnquist Courts portrait depicted by Professor Merrill. Before painting my
picture, however, I will first describe the one drawn by Professor Merrill in
order to provide the necessary frame of reference.
II. PROFESSOR MERRILL’S PORTRAIT OF TWO COURTS
Professor Merrill bases his argument that there have been two Rehnquist
Courts on what he sees as differences in both the Court’s characteristics and
behavior between its first and second eight years. Among the differences he
advances:
1. He states that the Rehnquist Court in its first eight years experienced
substantial turnover among the Justices but that since the October 1994 Term
there have been no membership changes on the Court.7
2. He states that the Rehnquist Court’s agenda in its first eight years
emphasized certain “hot button” social issues such as affirmative action,
abortion, and gay rights, but that since the October 1994 Term the Court
largely has abstained from looking at such cases.8
the past sixteen years, the Supreme Court has decided 1670 cases. Professor Merrill has
identified sixty-four cases that fall under either his “federalism” or “social issues” categories.
Merrill, supra note 1, at 580. That puts the scope of his analysis at 4% of the Court’s docket.
6. See Appendix infra.
7. Merrill, supra note 1, at 577 (“[T]he first Rehnquist court was characterized by a fairly
steady rate of turnover in personnel . . . whereas the second Rehnquist Court has been
characterized by nearly unprecedented stability in membership . . . .”). See also id. at 578 fig.1.
8. Id. at 580. From the first period to the second period, the number of social issue cases
has dropped from seventeen to nine. Id. at 581; see also id. at 581 fig.3. Professor Merrill’s data,
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3. He states that in its first eight years the Rehnquist Court reviewed
comparatively fewer constitutional federalism issues9 than it has looked at
during the subsequent eight years.10
4. He states that the first Rehnquist Court began a process of cutting in
half its docket, from 150 cases in the October 1986 Term to approximately 85
cases in the October 1993 Term, but that the second Rehnquist Court on
average has kept its docket per Term at between 75 and 85 cases.11
5. He states that as between the two periods, the second Rehnquist Court
has split 5-4 in more cases,12 but it has decided fewer cases by plurality.13
6. He states that in its first eight years ever-changing majority coalitions
formed in most of the Rehnquist Court’s 5-4 decisions,14 but that in the second
eight years one particular conservative five-Justice coalition has emerged—an
alliance made up of Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia, Thomas,
O’Connor and Kennedy (collectively known in recent years as the “Bush

however, do not show that cases he places in any of his subcategories have receded entirely from
the scene in the second period. His data indicate that the Court has been more reticent in looking
at “affirmative action” and “abortion” cases in the second period, but as to his other
subcategories, his data paint a different picture. For example, a statistical analysis of his data
show that the Court has reviewed the same percentage of “other privacy rights” cases (.5%) and
“government speech on religious topics” cases (.3%) in both periods. See id. at 654 app.A. As
for the subcategory of “gay rights” cases, his data actually contradict his claim since both cases he
identifies as gay right cases were decided by the Court in the second period. Id.
9. See supra note 3.
10. Merrill, supra note 1, at 581 (noting that the number of constitutional federalism case
increased from thirteen in first period to twenty-five in second period); see also id. at 581 fig.3.
Again Professor Merrill’s data both support and contradict his claim. He is on firmest ground
when he asserts that the first Rehnquist Court abstained from deciding cases about the scope of
congressional power. His research shows that the first Rehnquist Court decided no cases
construing the scope of Congress’s Commerce Clause power, but in the past eight years the Court
has decided four such cases. Identically, his data indicate that the Court did not decide any
Section 5 cases in the first period, but decided five such cases in the second period. See id. at 585
n.44. On the other hand, his list of cases indicate that the first Rehnquist Court decided almost as
many Tenth Amendment cases in period one (two cases) as it did in period two (three cases). See
id. at 655 app.A. Likewise his list of Eleventh Amendment cases shows the Rehnquist Court was
active in both periods (eleven cases in the first period and sixteen cases in the second period). Id.
11. See id. at 579 fig.2.
12. See id. at 638 (“[A] distinguishing attribute[] of the second Rehnquist Court . . . [is] the
increase in 5-4 decisions . . . .”); see also id. at 576 (“increasing numbers of 5-4 decisions on the
second Rehnquist Court”). However, Professor Merrill’s findings show that two of the highest
percentages of 5-4 decisions by term occurred in the first Rehnquist Court, in the October 1986
and 1989 terms. See id. at 588 fig.4.
13. See id. at 589 (noting that in period one plurality opinions made up 9% of decided cases,
but in period two the number has fallen to 6% of decided cases); see also id. at 590 fig.5.
14. See id. at 588 (“[T]he 5-4 conservative majorities in [the first period] do not have the
same monolithic quality as the 5-4 conservative majorities during the second Rehnquist Court”);
see also id. at 588 fig.4.
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Five”)15—and has become a predictable and reliable conservative voice
principally in the constitutional federalism cases, where the coalition has
fashioned an “aggressively conservative [state’s rights] jurisprudence.”16
Additionally, he states that there are signs that the same five-Justice coalition
has begun to branch out into other areas producing similar right-wing results.17
Having drawn this portrait of two Courts in the first part of his lecture,
Professor Merrill devotes the second half of his lecture to identifying factors
that he believes may explain the reason for the existence of the two Courts.
Among the reasons he gives are the following:
1. The emergence in the second Rehnquist Court of a “states’ rights”
jurisprudence in constitutional federalism cases is best explained by the change
of membership on the Court in the two periods, particularly by the substitution
of Justice Thomas for Justice White.18 Assessing their approach to deciding
issues of constitutional federalism, Professor Merrill sees Justices Thomas and
White to be “conservatives of a different stripe,”19 largely because when it
came to questions over the respective allocation of power between the federal
government and the states, Professor Merrill concludes that Justice White, in
fact, was not a conservative but, rather, was an “old fashioned New Deal
liberal.”20 In contrast, Professor Merrill describes Justice Thomas as having
consistently taken conservative positions in all areas,21 including questions of

15. The coalition made up of these particular five Justices is sometimes referred to (in some
circles) as the “Bush Five” because of the votes they cast in Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
See, e.g., Jamin B. Raskin, What’s Wrong With Bush v. Gore and Why We Need to Amend the
Constitution to Ensure It Never Happens Again, 61 MD. L. REV. 652 (2002); Laurence H. Tribe,
eroG .v hsuB and Its Disguises: Freeing Bush v. Gore from Its Hall of Mirrors, 115 HARV. L.
REV. 170 (2001). It was the votes by these five Justices that caused an ending to the recount in
Florida—the effect of which went far to hand over the 2000 Presidential election to George W.
Bush. See Law Professors for the Rule of Law, Law Professors’ Statement on Bush v. Gore, at
http://www.the-rule-of-law.com (last visited Feb. 13, 2003).
16. Merrill, supra note 1, at 574. Professor Merrill also notes that “[t]he Court has generated
a number of important innovations in the interpretation of these provisions, nearly always in
decisions in which the controlling opinion garners exactly five votes.” Id. at 570.
17. See id. at 589 (“conservative majority is in fact becoming stronger and is controlling an
increasing percentage of the decisions on the Court’s docket”); see also id. at 588 fig.4.
18. Id. at 574 (“[T]he emergence of an aggressively conservative jurisprudence in the area of
constitutional federalism can be explained . . . in part by the substitution of Thomas for
White . . . .”). As Professor Merrill points out, the substitution of Thomas for White was
roundabout. Id. at n.16.
19. Id. at 597.
20. Id. at 574. In defining Justice White as a “New Deal liberal,” Professor Merrill claims
that White was a proponent of broad national powers and not of expansive notions of states’
rights. Id.
21. Merrill, supra note 1, at 595 (“In contrast to White, Clarence Thomas can only be
described as conservative thorough-and-through.”).
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constitutional federalism.22 He identifies thirteen constitutional federalism
decisions—where he sees the majority conservative bloc as having pushed
through its conservative states’ rights agenda—as cases where he believes the
outcome would have been the opposite if Justice White, not Justice Thomas,
had cast the fifth vote.23
2. The second Rehnquist Court’s substitution of constitutional federalism
cases for those dealing with social issues24 is the result of what Professor
Merrill calls “strategic behavior”25 by three Justices—Justices Scalia,
O’Connor and Kennedy. Professor Merrill sees Justice Scalia’s complicity
with the other two Justices in, first, having the second Rehnquist Court avoid
looking at social issues cases and, second, having the Court shift its attention
towards deciding constitutional federalism cases as “strategic” because Justice
Scalia’s backing of these developments appears to be based neither in a sudden
lack of interest in social issues cases, nor in some newly acquired interest or
desire to review constitutional federalism cases, nor in any enthusiasm he
shares with his four conservative brethren for the states’ rights doctrine that the
five of them have fashioned in these cases.26 Instead, Professor Merrill
22. Id. at 596 (“[Thomas] has developed a compact theory of federalism based on the idea
that the Constitution was ratified by the States as opposed to the people, and he has adopted
narrow interpretations of federal statutes in order to preserve traditional state prerogatives.”)
(footnote omitted).
23. In his lecture, Professor Merrill lists the thirteen federalism cases where he sees Justice
Thomas as having cast the deciding vote. Id. at 598 n.102. He then goes on to surmise that there
cannot be much doubt that “if Justice White had remained on the Court he would have disavowed
these innovations.” Id. at 598. However, as to one of the cases Professor Merrill lists, Raygor v.
Regents of the University of Minnesota, 534 U.S. 533 (2002), regardless of whether or not
Justices White and Thomas would have voted differently in the case, it is inaccurate for Professor
Merrill to characterize Justice Thomas’s vote (or for that matter the vote of any one of the other
four conservative Justices) as indispensable to Court’s finding of Eleventh Amendment immunity
for the state university since the vote in favor of the state was actually six-three, and not 5-4.
Justice Ginsburg joined the Bush Five with an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment. Id. at 548.
24. But see supra notes 8 and 10 (close inspection of his data denotes that the shift in
emphasis that Professor Merrill claims to have occurred is not as dramatic as he suggests).
25. Professor Merrill makes a distinction between “reflexive” and “strategic” judicial
behavior. See Merrill, supra note 1, at 591-92. The Justices’ votes were reflexive when “their
votes [were] based solely on their individual reactions to the facts and legal issues presented.” Id.
at 591. In contrast, “strategic” voting involved the Justices considering “how other judges or
institutions [or the public] are likely to react to the decision.” Id. Professor Merrill views
strategic voting as constituting “insincere” behavior by judges who “censure the impulse to
embrace the outcome they prefer most and, instead, support outcomes they regard as less
desirable or second best because of their perceptions of the values embraced by other actors who
have the power to block the realization of the judge’s first preference.” Id. at 602.
26. Professor Merrill offers the following circumstantial evidence in support of his claim
that Justice Scalia’s endorsement of the Court’s states’ rights agenda has been largely strategic:
(1) Justice Scalia’s pro-national government statements before joining the Court; (2) his
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surmises that Justice Scalia’s strategic decision to participate in these
developments is based on his conclusion that it is wiser for him to be part of a
winning team and to have allies on the Court than it is for him to continue in
the role of a loner writing “principled,”27 yet dissenting, opinions.28 Professor

indecision in supporting states’ rights principles during his early years on the Court; (3) his
consistent pro-federal government position in preemption cases; (4) his relative silence in
federalism cases, that is, he has not assisted in the Court’s defense and development of its states’
rights jurisprudence by writing separate concurrences expounding on federalism principles, a role
he typically plays in those areas he cares about; and (5) his authorship of federalism opinions that
can best be described as perfunctory and that show a lack of passion for the states’ rights agenda.
Id. at 609-17. Professor Merrill concedes that there is some circumstantial evidence that cuts in
the other direction, see id. at 617-19, but on balance he concludes that the evidence in support of
strategic behavior outweighs that on the other side of the scale. Id. at 620.
27. By “principled,” I mean that which Professor Merrill terms judicial “reflexive” behavior.
See supra note 25. Professor Merrill sees Justice Scalia as having the choice between voting
reflexively and being in the minority or acting strategically and making concessions where he
could join forces with the other conservatives in obtaining conservative victories against the
opposing liberals on the Court. Merrill, supra note 1, at 606.
28. Professor Merrill argues that by 1993 Justice Scalia concluded that he was unlikely to
get a majority of the Court to endorse his conservative substantive agenda in social issue cases
(for example, overturning Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), or getting the Court to be more
accommodating with respect to school-sponsored prayer in public schools). Accordingly, he was
left with two options: either to persist in his substantive agenda knowing that he would more
often than not find himself on the short end and accept the role of “chronic dissenter,” or,
strategically, to get the Court to abandon, or at least to put to the side, social issues cases and
instead to have the Court concentrate in other areas where he could be part of a conservative
majority coalition. See Merrill, supra note 1, at 606. For various reasons—those being his
legacy, influencing majority opinions, potential reciprocity, and pleasing the Chief—Professor
Merrill believes that Justice Scalia chose the second option. Id. at 606-07.
Once again, a closer look at the Professor Merrill’s data raises substantial questions as to
the accuracy of his empirical claims. He clearly is correct in noting that Justice Scalia did suffer
setbacks in the first period in some of his attempts to get the majority to endorse at least part of
his conservative social agenda, most notably in the areas of abortion and prayer in public schools.
See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 979 (1992) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 631 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting). His effort in
Casey to get the Court to remove abortion from the list of unenumerated rights failed as did his
effort in Lee to get the Court to lower the wall of separation between church and state to
accommodate some types of school-sponsored prayer in public schools. There is also some basis
for Professor Merrill’s conjecture that after the addition to the Court of Justices Ginsburg and
Breyer that Justice Scalia would have concluded that his prospects of getting the Court after 1993
to come around to his position in these two areas became even bleaker and, thus, as a matter of
damage control, Justice Scalia might have decided that it was best to keep these kinds of cases
away from the Court. Based on these disappointments, Professor Merrill concludes that “[b]y
1993 . . . Justice Scalia’s substantive agenda lay in shambles.” Merrill, supra note 1, at 605.
Professor Merrill’s conclusion, however, seems overstated considering the results the
first Rehnquist Court reached in the cases that fall within other of his social issues subcategories.
For example, the Court’s decisions in the “other privacy rights” cases indicate that Justice Scalia
was largely successful in getting part of his conservative social agenda adopted in the first period.
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Merrill surmises that Justice Scalia—as a matter of strategy—also came to this
conclusion because he harbored a concern that were the Court to continue
focusing on social issues cases there was a substantial risk that the Court would
reaffirm or, even worse, expand particular doctrines that he abhors in areas he
cares passionately about, such as abortion and government-sponsored prayer in

In addition to his plan to have the Court eliminate unenumerated rights he opposes (for example,
abortion), Justice Scalia also sought to get the Court to forego adding new rights to the list of
unenumerated rights that qualify for substantive due process protection. See Troxel v. Granville,
530 U.S. 57, 92 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“I do not believe that the power which the
Constitution confers upon me as a judge entitles me to deny legal effect to laws that (in my view)
infringe upon what is (in my view) that unenumerated right.”). In period one, Justice Scalia
succeeded every time in getting the Court to resist attempts to have it recognize new
unenumerated rights. See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989) (Scalia, J.). Justice
Scalia was with the majority in all five of the cases Professor Merrill includes in his category of
“other privacy rights” in this period. In light of these successes, Professor Merrill is hard pressed
to make the categorical claim that by 1993 Justice Scalia would have seen his substantive agenda
in social issues cases “in shambles” and, accordingly, would have adopted a strategy of seeking to
get the Court from that time forward to avoid reviewing social issues cases (including all cases
concerning privacy rights). His track record in the first period in getting the Court to refrain from
establishing new nontextual rights was perfect and there existed no reason for him to believe that
were he to continue to push this part of his agenda, his record of success might come to an end.
As previously noted, the Court in the second period did not abstain from reviewing other privacy
cases. It reviewed three such cases. See Merrill, supra note 1, at 654 app.A; see also supra note
8. Moreover, there has been a replication of the pattern seen in period one. Again Justice Scalia
was no more successful in the second period than he was in the first in getting the Court to roll
back previously established rights that he opposes. See Troxel, 530 U.S. 57; M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519
U.S. 102 (1996). He continued, however, to be successful in getting the Court to refrain from
adding new unenumerated rights to the list of previously established ones. See, e.g., Washington
v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
Similarly, Professor Merrill’s findings in the area of affirmative action do not appear to
support his claim that by 1993 Justice Scalia wanted to get such cases off of the Court’s docket
because his win/loss record up to this time was poor and the prospects of his record improving in
the future was equally meager. See Merrill, supra note 1, at 608. It is true that in period one
Justice Scalia dissented in three of the Court’s four affirmative action decisions. In the fourth
case, however, Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989), Justice Scalia concurred in the
judgment and, no doubt, was pleased not only with the result (striking down the Richmond
affirmative action plan), but also with the Court’s movement towards adopting his color-blind
principle by its adoption of strict scrutiny review. See id. at 521 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“[T]he
principle embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment [is] that ‘our Constitution is color-blind, and
neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens.’” (quoting Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537,
559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting))). While Professor Merrill is correct in noting that in the
second period the Court decided only one additional affirmative action decision, it should be
pointed out that the result the majority reached in the case was one with which Justice Scalia
agreed and that moved the Court closer toward his color-blindness principle (that is, extending
strict scrutiny review to federal affirmative action programs and overruling Metro Broadcasting,
Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990), from which Justice Scalia had dissented).
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public schools.29 In reliance on what he sees as Justice Scalia’s strategic
behavior both in his efforts to get the Court to substitute constitutional
federalism cases for social issues cases and in his willingness—albeit while
holding his nose—to join in the development of a states’ rights jurisprudence,
Professor Merrill generalizes that Justice Scalia’s transformation from a
“reflexive judge” to a “strategic judge” has become so complete that Justice
Scalia has behaved strategically in seeking to influence “the entire course of
the Rehnquist Court over the last eight years.”30
No less strategic are the decisions by Justices O’Connor and Kennedy to
join with Justice Scalia in getting the Rehnquist Court to substitute
constitutional federalism cases for social issues cases.31 He also characterizes
as “strategic” certain votes the two have taken, which Professor Merrill views
as “switches.”32 His best guess as to what motivated the two Justices to act
strategically—both in their support of the legal agenda shift and in their later
switching sides to join the liberal Justices in social issues cases—was their
coming to the conclusion that they would rather be popular33 than principled.
That is, they decided that were the Court to continue reviewing social issues
cases and were the two of them to continue supporting conservative rulings in
such cases (as would be their true judgments were they to decide the cases
reflectively),34 that such behavior on their part would not have been a formula
29. Again Professor Merrill argues that Justice Scalia saw the Court’s results in cases like
Casey and Lee as disastrous and was concerned that were the Court to continue to review such
cases, it would only compound its mistakes. See Merrill, supra note 1, at 605-06. But cf. supra
note 28 (arguing that Justice Scalia had substantial success in getting the Court to adopt parts of
his conservative social agenda in period one, which success has carried over into period two).
30. Merrill, supra note 1, at 604.
31. As evidence of Justices O’Connor and Kennedy acting strategically in their support of
the Court’s shifting of its legal agenda from social issues cases to constitutional federalism cases,
Professor Merrill points to the consistent refusal by both Justices to vote to grant cert. in social
issues cases. Id. at 637.
32. The votes that Professor Merrill sees as “switches” are Justice Kennedy’s pro-abortion
vote in Casey, the votes by Justices O’Connor and Kennedy in Lee (supporting the more “liberal
separationist” approach to establishment clause issues, as opposed to the more “conservative
accomodationist” stance with which they previously had aligned), and their votes in support of
the Clinton administration’s liberal interpretations of civil rights laws. Id. at 633-36.
33. Professor Merrill believes there are several reasons why a Justice would like to be
popular: approval of the other branches maximizes their policy preferences, a good reputation
will lead to tangible benefits such as awards, honors, praise from academics, and a legacy that
will be looked upon kindly. Merrill, supra note 1, at 628-29.
34. Professor Merrill believes that Justices O’Connor and Kennedy, if acting reflexively,
would, among other things, prefer to overrule Roe, allow school-sponsored prayer in public
schools, and outlaw affirmative action. He bases this belief on what he sees as the decision of the
second Rehnquist court to generally deny cert. in social issues cases. The unavailability of four
Justices to vote to grant cert. in social issues cases is because: (1) the four liberal Justices are
unsure as to how Justices O’Connor and Kennedy would vote, whether reflexively with the other
conservatives or strategically with the four liberals; (2) the three staunch conservatives are one
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for either of them to make anyone’s list of most admired Americans.35 Thus,
Professor Merrill concludes that while both Justices O’Connor and Kennedy’s
reasons for supporting the shift in the Court’s legal agenda are different from
those that motivated Justice Scalia, they are similarly strategic.
3. Finally, Professor Merrill argues that the change from a Court in
constant flux to one whose membership has remained constant explains either
directly or indirectly the three other differences he sees between the two
Courts: (1) the shrinkage in the Court’s docket;36 (2) the increase in the
percentage of 5-4 decisions; and (3) the reduction in the number of plurality
decisions—all three of which Professor Merrill observes as having occurred in
the second period.37 More importantly, the change from “membership flux” to
“membership stasis” also explains the formation in the second period of a
cohesive coalition made up of the five most conservative Justices whose
cooperation and collaboration while most evident in the constitutional
federalism cases is also becoming apparent in other areas as well.38

vote shy of the necessary four votes to do so; (3) Justices O’Connor or Kennedy refuse to provide
the fourth vote because they do not want to be put in what they see as a no-win situation.
Therefore, “hot button” social issues that could hurt the reputation of Justices O’Connor or
Kennedy are put on the back burner, and constitutional federalism issues, largely seen as
technical and non-controversial, get the lion’s share of the Court’s time. Id. at 637-38.
35. Professor Merrill identifies four events that, in combination, might have convinced
Justices O’Connor and Kennedy to jump off the Scalia conservative agenda in social issues and to
have the Court eschew from continuing to review such cases before their popularity was
irrevocably tarnished: (1) Justice Thomas’ shabby treatment during his confirmation hearing; (2)
President Bush I’s capitulation on signing the Civil Rights Act of 1991; (3) the situation
surrounding the Casey decision; and (4) the unprecedented number of women elected to Congress
in 1992. Merrill, supra note 1, at 630-33.
36. Id. at 639-44. Professor Merrill believes that a court in flux will be more open to
changes in institutional norms which in the case of the first Rehnquist Court resulted in its
adoption of a more rigorous standard of review in granting cert. petitions. It was this change by
the Court in its standard for reviewing cert. petitions, so Professor Merrill argues, that best
explains the reduction in the number of cases the Court now reviews per Term. He credits Justice
Scalia for propounding the new norm and believes a big reason for Scalia’s success in getting the
Court to adopt the different standard was that he acted at a time when the Court was in flux and
where recently appointed Justices—more open to changes than those who had served on the
Court for a longer time—would be more amenable to going along with adjustments in
institutional norms.
37. Id. at 646-48. Professor Merrill postulates that Justices on a Court in flux will lack the
necessary information to gage other members’ inclinations in any given case. Without knowing
how their brethren will vote, the Court will have a harder time reaching a majority, and, thus, the
result will be more plurality opinions. In contrast, Justices on a stable Court will have a better
grasp of their colleagues’ predilections and preferences, which should allow them more easily to
reach agreements or compromises resulting in fewer plurality opinions.
38. Id. at 648-51. According to Professor Merrill’s game theory analysis, stability spawns
cooperation and compromise so that there is a greater likelihood on a stable Court as opposed to
one in flux for five Justices (the number needed to obtain a majority) to turn into a stable alliance
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III. THE REHNQUIST COURT’S FREE SPEECH JURISPRUDENCE: A PORTRAIT OF
ONE COURT
In contrast to Professor Merrill’s portrait, I now want to draw a different
portrait of the Rehnquist Court’s approach to free speech issues—a portrait of
a single Court that has behaved consistently throughout the entirety of the
Rehnquist Court.
A.

Evidence of Continuity

My review of the Rehnquist Court’s free speech decisions shows little
evidence between the two periods of such differences as:
1. A greater reticence by the Court to decide free speech cases;
2. A change in the kinds and concentration of free speech cases that the
Court has decided;
3. A shift in the Court’s overall hostility or hospitality towards free speech
claims (although there is some evidence of the Court’s greater
willingness to invalidate congressional efforts at regulating speech in
the second period);39 and
4. An emergence of a particular conservative five-Justice majority that is
calling the shots in free speech cases (although more recently there is
some evidence of this happening).40
1.

Decline in Free Speech cases in the Second Rehnquist Court?

As previously noted, Professor Merrill offers as partial evidence of two
distinct Rehnquist Courts what he sees as the Rehnquist Court’s shift in
emphasis from deciding social issues cases to deciding cases presenting issues
of constitutional federalism.41 A review of the Court’s free speech cases,
however, uncovers no evidence of any similar shift in emphasis by the Court in
the area of free speech over the same two periods. More precisely, there is no
evidence of the Court shunning free speech cases in the past eight years,
similar to that which Professor Merrill argues has occurred with respect to
cases falling into his social issues basket. Figure 1, which plots the number of
free speech cases decided by the Rehnquist Court from its first Term up to the
October 2001 Term,42 helps illustrate this point. While the actual numbers of
free speech cases dropped in the second period with the rest of the Court’s

that will become stronger and branch out over time. Professor Merrill argues that this has
occurred on the second Rehnquist Court with the establishment of the Bush Five, see supra note
15, which Professor Merrill sees as one manifestation of the stability of the second Rehnquist
Court.
39. See infra note 58.
40. See infra notes 63-64 and accompanying text.
41. See supra notes 7, 8, and 10.
42. For the cases used to generate Figure 1 and the associated statistics, see Appendix infra.
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docket, the percentage of free speech cases decided in each period has
remained constant. In every year of the Rehnquist Court, the Court has
decided on average slightly more than six free speech cases per Term, and
never less than two in any Term. During its first eight years, the Rehnquist
Court decided a total of 1011 cases, 65 of which were free speech cases. This
is a percentage of 6.4%. In its second eight years, the Court decided a total of
659 cases, 43 of which were free speech cases. That is a percentage of 6.5%.
In fact, during the past two Terms, the percentage of free speech cases has
increased to over 9% of the Court’s argued cases.43 If this trend continues, free
speech cases will become proportionally a larger part of the Court’s docket
than in the past.
FIGURE 1
Number of Free Speech Cases Decided by the Rehnquist Court
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2.

Change in Free Speech Agenda in the Second Rehnquist Court?

The data also show that there have not been any significant shift in the
kinds of free speech cases the Rehnquist Court decided in the two periods.
43. The 2000 Term heard eighty-six cases, eight of which were Free Speech cases (9%). See
Appendix infra. The 2001 Term heard seventy-five cases, seven of which were Free Speech
cases (9%). See Appendix infra.
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While, in both periods, the Court decided an eclectic group of free speech
cases, there is a substantial overlap in the kinds of cases the Court reviewed.
In both periods, the Court adjudged “commercial speech” cases, 44 “campaign
finance” cases,45 “religious speech” cases,46 “sexually explicit speech” cases,47
“cable regulation” cases,48 “campaign speech” cases,49 “abortion clinic protest”
cases,50 and so forth. The Court even reviewed nude dancing cases in both
periods.51 In fact, there are few, if any, free speech cases from one period that
cannot be paired with a case decided in the second period.
The data also show an overlap in the concentrations of types of cases. In
both periods, the Court’s preoccupation has been the same: money and sex. In
each period, the two largest categories of cases have been commercial speech
cases and sexually explicit speech cases. Between 1987 and 1994, the Court
decided eight commercial speech cases52 (about 12% of the total free speech
cases decided during that period). Between 1995 and 2002, the Court
reviewed nine commercial speech cases53 (approximately 21% of its free
speech docket). Sexually explicit speech cases—a category including

44. See, e.g., United States v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 418 (1993) (from the first period);
Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001) (from the second period).
45. See, e.g., Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990) (from the first
period); FEC v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. 431 (2001) (from the second
period).
46. See, e.g., Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993)
(from the first period); Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98 (2001) (from the
second period).
47. See, e.g., Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989) (from the
first period); Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997) (from the second period).
48. See, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994) (from the first period);
Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180 (1997) (from the second period).
49. See, e.g., Eu v. S.F. County Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214 (1989) (from the
first period); Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002) (from the second period).
50. See, e.g., Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753 (1994) (from the first
period); Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (2000) (from the second period).
51. See Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991) (from the first period); City of
Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277 (2000) (from the second period).
52. See Ibanez v. Fla. Dep’t of Bus. & Prof’l Regulation, Bd. of Accountancy, 512 U.S. 136
(1994); United States v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 418 (1993); Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761
(1993); City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410 (1993); Peel v. Attorney
Registration & Disciplinary Comm’n of Ill., 496 U.S. 91 (1990); Bd. of Trs. of the State Univ. of
N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469 (1989); Shapero v. Ky. Bar Ass’n, 486 U.S. 466 (1988); S.F. Arts &
Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522 (1987).
53. See Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357 (2002); Lorillard Tobacco Co. v.
Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001); United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405 (2001); L.A.
Police Dep’t v. United Reporting Publ’g Corp., 528 U.S. 32 (1999); Greater New Orleans Broad.
Ass’n, Inc. v. United States, 527 U.S. 173 (1999); Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc., 521
U.S. 457 (1997); 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996); Fla. Bar v. Went for
It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618 (1995); Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476 (1995).
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obscenity, near obscene speech, child pornography, and sexually explicit
speech deemed harmful to children—was also well represented in both periods.
Between 1987 and 1994, the Rehnquist Court decided eight cases dealing with
sexually explicit speech54 (about 12% of the total free speech cases decided
during that period). Between 1995 and 2002, the Court decided seven such
cases55 (approximately 16% of its free speech docket).
3.

Less Hospitable to Free Speech Claims in the Second Rehnquist
Court?

Another indicator of continuity throughout the duration of the Rehnquist
Court is the pro-free speech results seen in both periods. Figure 2 displays
these results graphically by comparing the records of success of the free speech
claimants and the government in both periods.56 Putting to the side the handful
of cases where both the free speech claimant and the government won,57 in the
first eight years, the free speech proponent prevailed thirty-four times with the
government victorious twenty-five times, a winning percentage for the free
speech advocate of 58%. In the second period, the free speech supporter
succeeded in twenty-six cases with the government triumphant in fifteen cases,
a win/loss percentage for the free speech partisan of over 60%. Whatever
differences exist in the Court’s makeup between the two periods, as well as the
changes from fluctuation to that of stability, the fact remains that in both
periods the party championing free speech rights found the Court more
hospitable than hostile.58

54. See Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544 (1993); Barnes, 501 U.S. 560; Osborne v.
Ohio, 495 U.S. 103 (1990); FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215 (1990); Sable
Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989); Massachusetts v. Oakes, 491 U.S.
576 (1989); Fort Wayne Books, Inc. v. Indiana, 489 U.S. 46 (1989); City of Newport v.
Iacobucci, 479 U.S. 92 (1986).
55. See Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564 (2002); City of L.A. v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535
U.S. 425 (2002); Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234 (2002); United States v.
Playboy Entm’t Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803 (2000); City of Erie, 529 U.S. 277; NEA v. Finley, 524
U.S. 569 (1998); Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997); Denver Area Educ. Telecomms.
Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727 (1996).
56. For the cases used to generate Figure 2, see Appendix infra.
57. See Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of W. N.Y., 519 U.S. 357 (1997); Denver Area
Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc., 518 U.S. 727; Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., Inc., 512
U.S. 753 (1994); Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass’n, 500 U.S. 507 (1991); FW/PBS, Inc., 493 U.S.
215; Fort Wayne Books, Inc., 489 U.S. 46; Sable Communications of Cal., Inc., 492 U.S. 115;
Boos v. Berry, 485 U.S. 312 (1988).
58. The federal government has an especially bad record against the free speech claimant in
the second period, having lost in eleven of fifteen cases. In comparison, the federal government
won nine, lost two, and tied two in the first period.
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FIGURE 2
Success Record in Free Speech Cases
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4.

Signs of an Increase in 5-4 Free Speech Decisions in the Second
Rehnquist Court and the Emergence of a Conservative Bloc?

Professor Merrill points to an increase in the percentage of 5-4 decisions in
the past eight years as further evidence of the existence of two different
Courts.59 Moreover, he sees one particular five-Justice conservative coalition
as having emerged in the second period and as having been calling the tune—a
conservative sounding one—that has been heard most clearly in the Court’s
constitutional federalism cases, but whose melody has also been detectable in
other areas as well.60
Turning to the free speech cases, one does not see a similar increase in the
absolute numbers of 5-4 decisions from the first to the second periods.
Between 1986 and 1994, the Court voted 5-4 in seventeen of its free speech
cases.61 Between 1995 and 2002, the Court split 5-4 in thirteen cases.62 On

59. See Merrill, supra note 1, at 587-89.
60. See id. at 650-51.
61. See Madsen, 512 U.S. 753; Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994); Int’l
Soc’y For Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee (II), 505 U.S. 672 (1992); Forsyth County v. The
Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123 (1992); Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030 (1991);
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the other hand, the percentage of 5-4 decisions has increased slightly, going
from 26% in the former period to 30% in the latter period. Perhaps of greater
saliency to Professor Merrill’s thesis is that the Bush Five accounts for five of
the thirteen 5-4 decisions in the second period, which constitutes 38% of the
total.63 Moreover, four of the five Bush Five decisions have occurred in the
past three Terms, and two of the four occurred this past Term.64
Whereas Professor Merrill’s findings support his claim that the Court had
divided into federalist and anti-federalist camps in its constitutional federalism
cases,65 the evidence of any similar dichotomy having formed in the free
speech area is less evident.66 Moreover, there is no support for any claim that
the Bush Five in those free speech cases whose outcome the coalition has
controlled can be seen as having struck conservative notes. In four of the 5-4
decisions where the coalition dictated the results, the prevailing party was the
free speech advocate.67 If there is now emerging in the area of free speech the
same five-Justice bloc that is calling the tunes for the Court in its constitutional
federalism cases, then it should be noted that the tune they are playing has been
largely pleasant to the ears of free speech claimants.

Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663 (1991); Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560
(1991); Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991); United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720 (1990);
Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62 (1990); United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310
(1990); Peel v. Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Comm’n of Ill., 496 U.S. 91 (1990);
FW/PBS, Inc., 493 U.S. 215; Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989); Fort Wayne Books, Inc.,
489 U.S. 46; Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378 (1987).
62. See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002); City of L.A. v. Alameda
Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425 (2002); W. States Med. Ctr. v. Thompson, 535 U.S. 357 (2002);
Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001); FEC v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign
Comm., 533 U.S. 431 (2001); Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533 (2001); Boy Scouts
of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000); United States v. Playboy Entm’t Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803
(2000); Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc., 521 U.S. 457 (1997); Turner Broad. Sys.,
Inc., 520 U.S. 180; Schenck, 519 U.S. 537; Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515
U.S. 819 (1995); Fla. Bar v. Went for It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618 (1995).
63. See Republican Party of Minn., 536 U.S. 765; Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425;
Lorillard Tobacco Co., 533 U.S. 525; Dale, 530 U.S. 640; Rosenberger, 515 U.S. 819.
64. See cases cited supra note 63.
65. See supra note 23 (listing cases where the court divided into the same two camps); see
generally Kathleen Sullivan, Dueling Sovereignties: U.S. Terms Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 109
HARV. L. REV. 78 (1995).
66. See supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text.
67. The free speech claimant prevailed in Republican Party of Minn., 536 U.S. 765;
Lorillard Tobacco Co., 533 U.S. 525; Dale, 530 U.S. 640; and Rosenberger, 515 U.S. 819.
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Changes in Winning/Losing Percentages in Free Speech Cases of
Those Five Justices Whose Careers Have Spanned the Entire Period
of the Rehnquist Court

Professor Merrill notes that four of the current Justices—Justices Scalia,
O’Connor, Stevens and Kennedy68—have served alongside William Rehnquist
throughout the entirety of his tenure as Chief Justice. Again, Professor Merrill
views as one consequence of the decision of three of the four—Justices Scalia,
O’Connor and Kennedy—to have engaged in strategic behavior during the past
eight years69 to be the impressive win/loss record the three have achieved
along with that of Justice Thomas and the Chief Justice in the second period in
the Court’s constitutional federalism cases.70 Generalizing from the successes
Chief Justice Rehnquist and the other members of the Bush Five have had in
the area of constitutional federalism, Professor Merrill characterizes the second
Rehnquist Court as not only distinct from the Court that sat from 1986 until
1994, but also as one that is ‘“disciplined”’ and “well-oiled”—a Court that
smoothly and almost effortlessly has and continues to spew out legal rules that
the Chief Justice and the other conservative Justices have found largely to their
liking.71
If Professor Merrill’s assessment of the Second Rehnquist Court as an
efficient machine that consistently has been cranking out a steady stream of
conservative decisions is correct, it should follow that a comparison of the
win/loss records of the nine Justices in free speech decisions in the second
period would show the conservative Justices to have better records than that of
their more liberal colleagues. One should also expect to see Justice Scalia’s
win/loss record in free speech cases to have improved in the second period in
light of his transformation from a “reflexive” judge to a “strategic” one, a
change after all that Justice Scalia has made—or so Professor Merrill claims—
at least in part for the purpose of improving his win/loss record generally.
Moreover, for the same reason, his ratio of wins to losses in free speech cases

68. See Merrill, supra note 1, at 593 n.75. Kennedy replaced Powell one year into the
Rehnquist Court. “[F]or practicable purposes Justice Kennedy has been a fixture of the Court
throughout its duration.” Id.
69. See id. at 601 (discussing Justice Scalia); id. at 628-38 (discussing Justices Kennedy and
O’Connor).
70. See id. at 597 n.98. Although the Bush Five has racked up an impressive number of
victories in the second period in those cases that Professor Merrill includes within the category of
constitutional federalism cases, the coalition’s batting average is not 1.000. For example, four of
the Bush Five were in dissent in U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 799 (1995). In that
case, Justice Kennedy switched over to join the four more liberal Justices in rejecting the states’
right position offered by Arkansas. Likewise, in Hess v. Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corp., 513
U.S. 30 (1994), Justice Kennedy again abandoned the other four conservative Justices in joining
with the liberals in rejecting the Eleventh Amendment immunity claim.
71. Merrill, supra note 1, at 590.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2003]

CONTINUITY ON THE COURT

851

in the second period should be better than that of his four more liberal
colleagues. Similarly, Professor Merrill’s claim that Chief Justice Rehnquist
finds the overall work product of the second Rehnquist Court to be largely
compatible with his jurisprudential views72 should also be reflected in an
improvement in the Chief Justice’s win/loss record in free speech cases in the
second period. In contrast, Justice Stevens, the one liberal Justice whose
tenure has extended over both periods of the Rehnquist Court, should have
seen his record decline, as the bonds of reciprocity among the conservative
Justices that Professor Merrill sees as having strengthened and deepened begin
to impact on all areas of the Court’s docket including its free speech cases.
The data, however, do not support such findings. Figure 3A, which
compares the winning percentages of Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
Scalia, O’Connor, Kennedy, and Stevens in free speech cases in both periods,
and Figure 3B, which shows the winning percentages in free speech cases of
all of the Justices currently serving on the second Rehnquist Court, tell a
different story than the one suggested above.73 During the first eight years of
the Rehnquist Court, Justice Scalia was with the majority in free speech cases
an impressive 78% of the time. In the last eight years, his winning percentage
in free speech cases fell to 65%. In his first eight years as Chief Justice,
William Rehnquist voted with the majority 71% of the time in free speech
cases. Since then his winning percentage has fallen to 67%. While Justice
Scalia and the Chief Justice have won more free speech cases than they have
lost (as is true for all of the Justices), the fact remains that their win/loss
records have fallen, not risen, during the second Rehnquist Court. On the other
hand, Justice Stevens’ record in free speech cases has actually improved
between the two periods.

72. See id.
73. For the cases used to generate Figures 3A and 3B, see Appendix infra.
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FIGURE 3A
Winning Percentage of Justices (Both Periods)
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FIGURE 3B
Win Percentage in Free Speech Cases
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Drop in the Number of Plurality Opinions in Free Speech Cases in the
Second Rehnquist Court?

The final difference that Professor Merrill identifies for distinguishing
between the first and second Rehnquist Courts is a decline in the number of
plurality opinions in the second period.74 Along with social issues cases,
Professor Merrill argues that plurality opinions have largely receded from the
scene during the second Rehnquist Court. Here, the evidence in the free
speech area corresponds somewhat, but not entirely, with what Professor
Merrill’s claims to be the almost total demise of plurality opinions during the
second period of the Rehnquist Court. Figure 4 plots the number of plurality
opinions in free speech cases per Term from the beginning of the Rehnquist
Court through the October 2001 Term.75 As the chart shows, in the first
period, there were sixteen free speech cases where a majority was unable to
join one opinion. The number of plurality opinions has dropped to eight in the
second period. Percentage-wise, however, the decline has been less dramatic,
going from 25% to 19%. In looking at the number and percentage of plurality
decisions in free speech cases in the second period, however, one can not
assert, as Professor Merrill does, that such opinions are close to becoming
extinct in the second Rehnquist Court. In the area of free speech, it seems
inaccurate even to characterize plurality opinions as having become an
endangered species in the second Rehnquist Court.

74. See supra note 37.
75. For the cases used to generate Figure 4, see Appendix infra.
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FIGURE 4
Number of Plurality Opinions in Free Speech Cases
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III. SO WHAT DOES MY PORTRAIT SAY ABOUT PROFESSOR MERRILL’S
PORTRAIT?
The question remains: What do my findings tell us about Professor
Merrill’s thesis. In particular what do they tell us about the importance and/or
universality of the causal factors that he points to as explaining the differences
he sees, especially the differences in the shift from social issues cases to
constitutional federalism issues cases? I see three possible answers:
First, perhaps there is something special about free speech cases so that
Professor Merrill is right not to include them in his basket of social issues
cases. Therefore, one should not expect any—much less all—of the political
science models he uses to provide explanations for the Court’s behavior. Free
speech cases can be seen as an outlier of the Court’s legal jurisprudence. Why,
however, should that be the case? Surely issues such as child pornography,
restrictions on cigarette advertising directed at children, and sexually explicit
speech on the Internet, to name three free speech issues with which the second
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Rehnquist Court has grappled,76 are no less “social” and no less “hot button”
issues than those Professor Merrill has defined as falling within his basket of
social issues.77

76. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234 (2002) (child pornography);
Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001) (cigarette advertising directed at children);
Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997) (sexually explicit speech on the Internet).
77. As noted earlier, see supra note 4, Professor Merrill offers a rebuttal to criticisms about
how he created his “social issues” category. Essentially, he argues that he only wanted to include
cases where liberals and conservatives are starkly divided—like abortion and affirmative action.
See Merrill, supra note 1, at 580 n.23. In doing so, he is able to exclude free speech (for example,
obscenity cases) because such cases do not polarize the right and the left. Rather, most
Americans, wherever they fall on the political spectrum, for the most part see eye-to-eye on most
free speech issues (for example, they favor government regulation of obscenity, child
pornography and false and misleading advertising, and they oppose government regulation of
political speech).
My response to this rebuttal is that even accepting the reluctance of his criterion
(“cultural war”), it is not clear it serves to distinguish several, if not most, of the cases he includes
in his social issues basket from the vast majority of free speech cases that he excludes. For
example, while it is true that most Americans support government regulation of child
pornography and oppose government regulation of political speech, it is also the case that most
Americans oppose physician-assisted suicide and support parental rights. Accordingly, it is
difficult to distinguish Professor Merrill’s “other privacy cases” from free speech cases.
There is, however, a second response that is more fundamental: how appropriate is his
“culture war” criterion in the first place? Professor Merrill uses it to identify cases that he
believes Justices O’Connor and Kennedy for strategic reasons wanted to avoid deciding because
if they decided these issues reflexively (that is, supported conservative results) they would have
risked losing popularity with the political (liberal) elite. This is something Professor Merrill
surmises that they want to avoid, especially if the shabby way the liberal elite treated Justice
Thomas during his confirmation hearings is any indication of their wrath. See Merrill, supra note
1, at 630-31 (noting that the inclusion into Thomas’s confirmation hearing of Anita Hill’s
allegations of sexual impropriety by the nominee served as “a warning to the sitting Justices that
if they persisted down the path of seeking to overturn Roe and securing other conservative
objectives, they could expect equivalent retaliation of an unspecified nature”)
The “culture war” criterion, even if valid, cannot explain the behavior of either Justice
O’Connor or Justice Kennedy in their approach to free speech cases. If Professor Merrill is
correct that Justices O’Connor and Kennedy wanted to avoid cases (that is, cases Professor
Merrill places in his social issues basket) that if they voted “conservative” they would get in
trouble with powerful (liberal) forces with whom they do not want to quarrel, it should also
follow that the two of them would want to avoid deciding cases that would get everyone angry at
them—liberals and conservatives alike. Moreover, if Professor Merrill is right that both liberals
and conservatives are pretty much on the same page when it comes to regulation of speech and if
conservatives and liberals alike have no problem with government regulation of obscenity and
sexually-explicit speech generally, then Justices O’Connor and Kennedy—consistent with
Professor Merrill’s thesis—would avoid casting votes that would upset everyone. Yet, both
Justices O’Connor and Kennedy voted to strike down the Communications Decency Act, see
Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234 (2002), which was popular legislation, and they
both voted to strike down government attempts to shield children from tobacco advertising, which
is also popular legislation. Moreover, Justice Kennedy (although not Justice O’Connor) twice
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A second possibility is that maybe there is something special and unique
about the sixty-four cases to which Professor Merrill has confined his analysis,
so that the models apply to them, but not to other areas of the Court’s docket.
If that is the case78—and putting to the side what that tells us about the
universality of the factors—is it still accurate to talk about two distinct courts
where the significant shifts in legal agenda on which Professor Merrill focuses
in distinguishing the two Courts are confined to such a small portion of the
Court’s caseload?
Whereas these first two arguments question the size of Professor Merrill’s
thesis (that is, are we talking about a pattern in 4% of the cases, 100%, or
something in between?), the third criticism is more fundamental. Professor
Merrill’s thesis does not just describe an empirical pattern of “two Courts”
over a sixteen year period. It also suggests a causal explanation for the twoCourt pattern. If, however, this causal analysis is correct, then the same causes
should have created the same two-Court pattern in the free speech cases, unless
such cases are materially distinguishable from the other social issues cases
Professor Merrill includes in his 4% sample. The simple fact that there is no
such pattern in these free speech cases forces us to question the validity of the
causal analysis at the heart of his thesis. When an expanded study of relevant
cases finds that exceptions to a theory far outnumber the relatively small
number of cases that originally suggested the theory, the theory has problems.

voted to strike down laws banning flag burning, which were also popular laws. See, United
States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
My point is that in the free speech area both Justices have shown no reluctance to vote in
ways that have been unpopular in both periods. Why should we accept Professor Merrill’s thesis
that they have conspired to get the Court to avoid (other) cases because they wanted to protect
their reputations when they have not behaved that way in the free speech area?
78. Again, I am not persuaded that Professor Merrill’s social issues cases are distinguishable
from free speech cases or that his political science models explain those differences that do exist
between the two periods. See supra notes 8 and 10.
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APPENDIX
Rehnquist Court Free Speech Cases
1986-2002
KEY:
F: First Amendment Claimant was the victor
G: Government entity was the victor
D: Draw—both the First Amendment Claimant and Government entity won on
at least one issue
1986-87 Term

1994-95 Term

S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States

Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va.,

Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522 (1987). (G)

515 U.S. 819 (1995). (F)

Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378 (1987).

Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette,

(F)

515 U.S. 753 (1995). (F)

City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451 (1987).

Fla. Bar v. Went for It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618 (1995).

(F)

(G)

Bd. of Airport Comm’rs v. Jews for Jesus,

Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual

Inc., 482 U.S. 569 (1987). (F)

Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557 (1995). (F)

Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465 (1987). (G)

Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476 (1995).
(F)

Ark. Writers’ Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481

McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334

U.S. 221 (1987). (F)

(1995). (F)

FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479

United States v. Nat’l Treasury Employees Union,

U.S. 238 (1986). (F)

513 U.S. 454 (1995). (F)

Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479
U.S. 208 (1986). (F)
City of Newport v. Iacobucci, 479 U.S. 92
(1986). (G)

1987-88 Term

1995-96 Term

Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C.,

Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc.

Inc., 487 U.S. 781 (1988). (F)

v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727 (1996). (D)

Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988). (G)

Bd. of County Comm’rs. v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668
(1996). (F)

City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ’g Co.,

O’Hare Truck Serv., Inc. v. City of Northlake, 518

486 U.S. 750 (1988). (F)

U.S. 712 (1996). (F)

Shapero v. Ky. Bar Ass’n, 486 U.S. 466

Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FEC,

(1988). (F)

518 U.S. 604 (1996). (F)

Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414 (1988). (F)

44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484
(1996). (F)
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Lyng v. Int’l Union, United Auto.,
Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers of
Am., UAW, 485 U.S. 360 (1988). (G)
Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312 (1988). (D)
Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46
(1988). (F)
Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kulmeier, 484 U.S.
260 (1988). (F)

1988-89 Term

1996-97 Term

Bd. of Trs. of the State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox,

Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997). (F)

492 U.S. 469 (1989). (G)
Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC,

Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc., 521

492 U.S. 115 (1989). (D)

U.S. 457 (1997). (G)

Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v.

Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S.

Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657 (1989). (F)

351 (1997). (G)

Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781

Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180

(1989). (G)

(1997). (G)

Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989). (F)

Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of W. N.Y., 519
U.S. 357 (1997). (D)

Fla. Star v. B.J.F, 491 U.S. 524 (1989). (F)
Massachusetts v. Oakes, 491 U.S. 576
(1989). (F)
Thornburgh v. Abbot, 490 U.S. 401 (1989).
(G)
Eu v. S.F. County Democratic Cent. Comm.,
489 U.S. 214 (1989). (F)
Fort Wayne Books, Inc. v. Indiana, 489 U.S.
46 (1989). (D)

1989-90 Term

1997-98 Term

United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720

NEA v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569 (1998). (G)

(1990). (G)
Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1

Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S.

(1990). (G)

666 (1998). (G)

Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62
(1990). (F)
United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310
(1990). (F)
Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1 (1990).
(F)
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Peel v. Attorney Registration and
Disciplinary Comm’n of Ill., 496 U.S. 91
(1990). (F)
Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103 (1990). (G)
Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 496
U.S. 652 (1990). (G)
Butterworth v. Smith; 494 U.S. 624 (1990).
(F)
FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n,
493 U.S. 411 (1990). (G)
FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215
(1990). (D)

1990-91 Term

1998-99 Term

Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030

Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n, Inc. v. United

(1991). (G)

States, 527 U.S. 173 (1999). (F)

Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663

Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., Inc.,

(1991). (G)

525 U.S. 182 (1999). (F)

Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560
(1991). (G)
Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501
U.S. 496 (1991). (G)
Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass’n, 500 U.S. 507
(1991). (D)
Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991). (G)
Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439 (1991).
(F)

1991-92 Term

1999-2000 Term

Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v.

Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000).

Lee, 505 U.S. 672 (1992). (G)

(F)

Lee v. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness,

Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (2000). (G)

Inc., 505 U.S. 830 (1992). (F)
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul., 505 U.S. 377

United States v. Playboy Entm’t Group, Inc., 529

(1992). (F)

U.S. 803 (2000). (F)

Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428 (1992).

City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277 (2000).

(G)

(G)

Forsyth Countyv. Nationalist Movement, 505

Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys. v.

U.S. 123 (1992). (F)

Southworth, 529 U.S. 217 (2000). (G)

Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191 (1992).

Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377

(G)

(2000). (G)
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Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the

L.A. Police Dep’t v. United Reporting Publ’g

N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105

Corp., 528 U.S. 32 (1999). (G)

(1991). (F)

1992-93 Term

2000-01 Term

Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544

Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525

(1993). (G)

(2001). (F)

United States v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S.

FEC v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm.,

418 (1993). (G)

533 U.S. 431 (2001). (G)

Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476 (1993).

United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405

(G)

(2001). (F)

Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free

Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S.

Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993). (F)

98 (2001). (F)

El Vocero de P.R. (Caribbean Int’l. News

Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001). (F)

Corp.) v. Puerto Rico, 508 U.S. 147 (1993).
(F)
Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761 (1993). (F)

Shaw v. Murphy, 532 U.S. 223 (2001). (F)

City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network,

Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533

Inc., 507 U.S. 410 (1993). (F)

(2001). (F)
Cook v. Gralike, 531 U.S. 510 (2001). (F)

1993-94 Term

2001-02 Term

Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., Inc., 512

Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765

U.S. 753 (1994). (D)

(2002). (F)

Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S.

Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of N.Y., Inc. v.

622 (1994). (F)

Vill. of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150 (2002). (F)

Ibanez v. Fla. Dep’t of Bus. & Prof’l

Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564 (2002). (G)

Regulation, Bd. of Accountancy, 512 U.S.
136 (1994). (F)
City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43 (1994).

City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535

(F)

U.S. 425 (2002). (G)

Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661 (1994).

Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357

(G)

(2002). (F)
Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234
(2002). (F)
Thomas v. Chi. Park Dist., 534 U.S. 316 (2002).
(G)

